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Abstract 
 The financial crisis of 2007-08 puts in question the capability of market regulators to 
act on behalf of investors to guarantee that the information available is accurate and reliable. In 
this study, we research 45 firms that have been enforced by the SEC between 2010-2013 for 
alleged corporate misconduct. We find that fraud firms experience non-significant negative 
abnormal returns prior to SEC’s announcement, however after the event day, the abnormal 
returns are positive. We also find significant increases in the mean residuals bid-ask spreads, 
meaning that after the event, fraud firms became riskier, leading investors to demand higher 
returns which increases eventual financial distress costs. Finally, we study the governance 
characteristics for 32 fraud firms and 32 control firms (non-enforced) one year prior to SEC’s 
enforcement and the following four years (2009-2016) finding that fraud firms have slightly 
poorer governance. Outside directors dominate the board of directors for both groups, fraud 
firms have larger boards and more board meetings. Moreover, the majority of CEOs are also 
Chairman of the board for both groups, blockownership increases and institutional ownership 
decreases for both the groups and director’s compensation is affected by regulators activity, as 
it can affect future returns. 
 Our results show that fraud firms are identical to non-fraud firms, financial crime has 
become more complexed and regulators are slow to identify and judge corporate misconduct. 
On the other hand, fraud firms are quicker to make the proper adjustments in their structures, 
becoming more identical to non-fraud firms. 
 
Resumo 
 A crise financeira de 2007-08 questiona a capacidade das entidades reguladoras de 
actuar em prol dos investidores de forma a garantir informação credível e confiável. 
Investigámos 45 empresas processadas pela SEC entre 2010 e 2013 por gestão danosa. 
Descobrimos que as empresas fraudulentas registam retornos anormais negativos antes da 
divulgação da SEC, no entanto depois do dia do anúncio, as empresas registam retornos 
anormais positivos. Também descobrimos mudanças significativas nas médias dos residuals 
bid-ask spreads, significando que o risco empresarial aumenta, levando os investidores a 
requerer taxas de retorno maiores para os seus investimentos, criando possiveis dificuldades 
financeiras no futuro. Finalmente, estudámos as características de governo para 32 empresas 
fraudulentas e 32 empresas de controle (sem processos judiciais) um ano antes da divulgação 
da SEC e quatro anos aseguir (2009 a 2016) descobrindo que as empresas fraudulentas possuem 
pior governo. Directores independentes dominam o conselho administrativo para ambos os 
grupos, empresas fraudulentas têm conselhos maiores e mais reuniões. Além disso, a maioria 
dos CEOs são também presidentes do conselho, grandes acionistas aumentam e acionistas 
institucionais diminuem a sua participação para ambos os grupos e a compensação dos 
directores é afectada pelas acções judiciais dos reguladores, pois afectam retornos futuros. 
 Os nossos resultados evidênciam que as empresas fraudulentas e não fraudulentas são 
idênticas, pois os crimes financeiros estão mais complexos e os reguladores são lentos a actuar. 
Por outro lado, as empresas fraudulentas fazem ajustes rapidamente à sua estrutura de forma a 
ficarem mais parecidas com as empresas não fraudulentas. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Market regulators, like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), have the role 
to regulate stocks, bonds and other securities with the purpose to provide accurate and 
meaningful information to investors and maintain investor’s hope in the financial markets. 
However, 1929-30 crisis and more recently the financial crisis of 2007-08 put people 
wondering the efficiency of these entities as regulators. Both financial crises have similar 
causes and patterns that we can look at, to predict future crises. Eingner and Umlauft (2015) 
state that the 1920’s period is characterized by economic prosperity and fraud likewise in 
the period before the Financial Crisis of 2007-08. 
The period before The Great Financial Crisis of 2007-2008 and Great Depression (1929-
1933) is marked by a rising in the housing market, financial innovation, deregulation and 
private debt, mostly in mortgage debt, which contributed for the subprime bubble (Eingner 
and Umlauft 2015). On the other hand, it is also marked by fraud. Charles Ponzi, through 
his fraudulent business scheme in the 1920s, embezzled his investors in twenty million 
dollars, just like Bernie Madoff decades after. The aftermath of both financial crises is 
somehow identical: Strong failure of the banking system due to repayment or refinancing 
problems and decline in housing prices which led to an increase in default rates, and a 
decline in consuming spending which led businesses to slow down and employment 
increase (Eingner and Umlauft 2015). 
The costs of corporate fraud and fraudulent bankruptcy are a real problem of the modern 
business. Every two years, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) publishes 
a report on Occupational Fraud and Abuse. In 2016, it analysed 2127 cases which resulted 
in a total loss of 6.3 billion dollars, with an average loss of 2.7 million dollars per case. 
Asset misappropriation is the most common form of occupational fraud (83% of the cases), 
however with the smallest median loss of $125.000. On the other hand, financial statement 
fraud is the least form of occupational fraud (< 10% of the case) but with a median loss of 
$975.000. Hence, it is imperative to study the costs associated with litigation risk on 
companies in financial distress and illegal activities. 
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This paper aims to examine the theoretical and empirical relationship between 
management fraudulent activities and the impact of SEC’s enforcements in public traded 
fraudulent firms after the Financial Crisis of 2007-08. Our main research objectives are: 1) 
to examine either or not investors see fraud firms as riskier for their investments 2) if firm’s 
returns are negatively affected by regulatory penalties and finally 3) if governance 
mechanisms are weaker for fraud firms than for non-fraud firms.  
Our results suggest that fraud firm’s returns are not significantly affected by regulatory 
enforcements although they become riskier, leading investors to demand higher returns 
which increases eventual financial distress costs and that fraud firm’s governance are 
identical to non-fraud firms, making it harder and harder for regulators to foresee criminal 
financial practises.
____________________ 
1Maxwell, J. C. (2007). The 21 irrefutable laws of leadership: Follow them and people will follow you 
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2. Literature Review 
“Everything rises and falls on leadership”1. The recent financial crisis and its aftermath 
has shown, above all, the results of poor management decisions leading to fraudulent 
bankruptcies, illegal activities and the cost of legal proceedings. Research in corporate 
governance and financial regulation has been gaining awareness in the last decades, as they 
play an extreme role in order to reduce fraudulent activities by monitoring and controlling, 
therefore helping reduce costs for companies in distress. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) in their theory of the firm defend that firms are simply legal 
fictions which create relationships through contracts. This includes external contracts with 
firms, non-profit institutions (hospitals, universities, foundations), financial institutions 
(banks and insurance companies) and governmental bodies (cities, states, federal 
government, government enterprises and so on). On the other hand, internal contracts, are 
made between managers, employees, equity holders and debtholders. Firms enter in 
financial distress when they have trouble meeting its debt obligations, therefore violating 
contracts previously made, increasing in this way the likelihood of bankruptcy. 
 
 2.1 Agency Problems 
Agency relationship can be defined as a contract between one or more persons where 
the principal engages another person (the agent) to perform some service in their behalf 
despite agent’s own interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The relationship between 
managers and shareholders fits in this definition. Assuming that both parties are utility 
maximizers, this is, that both individuals tend to maximize their own general well being, 
there is good reasons for management not to always act in the best interest of the 
stockholders, which economists call: an agency problem. Agency problems arise when 
managers face the ethical dilemma of acting according to their own interest or shareholders’ 
interests. To mitigate the cost of these problems (agency costs) shareholders give incentives 
to managers to motivate them to behave according to their interests and incur in monitoring 
costs to observe and sometimes restrict managers’ actions
    4 
 
 
 2.1.1 Ownership 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) study the agency costs arising from the of separation of 
ownership and control in a firm between managers, stockholders and debtholders. They 
argue that equity holders (manager-owner) are residual claimants and as their ownership 
falls, the probability to use firm’s resources into their own benefit rises, in form of 
perquisites (jets, cars, etc…). Agency costs between managers and debtholders rises when 
firms want to take advantage of investment opportunities without losing ownership. They 
do not find high leveraged firms, as over borrowing stimulates managers to do risky 
investments. Debtholders include covenants to limit management’s actions and protect 
themselves from incentive effects. Covenants can impose constrains on dividends, firm’s 
operations, minimum economic and financial ratios therefore reducing firm’s profitability 
by limiting investments in some projects. Finally, high leveraged firms face the possibility 
of missing debt obligations, leading to bankruptcy and reorganization costs. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) conclude that firm structure should be an equilibrium between outside 
debt and equity thereby reducing agency costs. 
Board of directors is the highest internal control mechanism in a firm, which role is to 
“run board meetings and oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating, and compensating 
the CEO” (Jensen, 1993), enhancing corporate governance. Gilson (1990) classifies the 
directors as: outsiders (no relationship with the firm other than their role as directors), 
insiders (member of the management team) and quasi-insiders (weak relationship, but not 
managers – retired managers, relatives to current managers and lawyers). As a firm grows, 
its demands for specialized board services might also grow. Jensen (1993) and Yermack 
(1996) argue that larger boards experience stronger deficiency of internal control 
mechanisms in restructuring or redirecting their businesses than smaller boards. 
Furthermore, Coles et al. (2008) propose that complex firms (large size, high leveraged or 
well diversified across industries) perform better with very large or very small boards. 
Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) study the relationship between 
inside ownership and performance for American firms. They show that the majority of 
board members do not own a large percentage of the firm and performance increases as 
management ownership increases in a range between 0% and 25%. These results suggest 
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that an increase in inside ownership reflect a convergence of managers’ and shareholders’ 
interests.  
Managers are concerned about their performance and its reward mechanism (Fama, 
1980). Warner et al. (1988) find that the probability of changes in top management is 
inversely related to stock performance arguing that managers are hold accountable for stock 
performance. Furthermore, if the rewarding system is not attractive, best managers are the 
first ones to leave the firm. In order to mitigate this, the board of directors gives incentives 
to managers, such as performance bonuses, salary revisions and stock options. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990) show that pay-to-performance incentives to CEOs are relatively low and 
the majority comes from owning firm’s stocks, however such are small and declining, being 
consistent with Morck et al. results (1988). Core et al. (1999) find a negative relation 
between CEO’s ownership and CEO’s compensation and find no evidence that outside 
directors are more effective in monitoring than inside directors.  
The hypothesis that outside directors promote shareholders’ interests is debatable. 
Several studies in the outside directors (Brickley, Coles, and Terry, 1994; Byrd and 
Hickman, 1992) show the importance in the outcome of takeover bids and stock 
performance as the firm applies anti-takeover devices, such as, poison pills. They conclude 
that firms that have significant outside directors on their boards experience, on average, 
positive abnormal returns suggesting that outside directors serve shareholders’ interests in 
control contest events. However, Byrd and Hickman (1992) argue that outside directors 
should not own a great fraction of the company (> 60%) as it shows a negative effect in 
shareholder wealth. Overall, a board that is dominated by outside directors could impose 
ineffective limitations to management and shareholders’ benefits when managers own a 
small fraction of firm’s stocks.    
Financial distressed firms experience lower performance than its competitors (Opler and 
Titman, 1994) which leads to management restructures and board turnovers. Gilson (1990) 
shows that, on average, only 43% of CEOs remain within their firms until the conclusion 
of the bankruptcy or debt restructure. The majority of the board directors also tend to leave 
when the CEO resigns (51%), shifting control to creditors and blockholders (owns at least 
5% of the shares). Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) conclude that nearly one-third of the CEOs 
are replaced after one year around the default and experience a cut in their bonuses and 
compensations.  
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 2.1.2 Liquidity 
Jensen (1986) in his free cash flow hypothesis studies the level of excess cash that 
management should be allowed to use to fund all good projects (positive NPV) and to use 
it to reduce agency costs. Excess cash flows can be used to increase dividends or engage in 
share repurchases, reducing management likelihood to invest in low-return projects or use 
resources for their own interests. Why would managers invest in projects that damage firm 
value? Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that CEOs are overconfident in their past 
investments and struggle to change their investment policies to new opportunities. Other 
reason is that managers prefer to run large firms than small firms, growing its size beyond 
optimal, making it larger but not more profitable (Jensen, 1986). Hardford, Mansi, and 
Maxwell (2008) find that weaker governance firms hold lower cash reserves, invest less in 
R&D and engage more in share repurchase, being a more flexible mechanism of increasing 
shareholder value. On the other hand, stronger governance firms choose to increase 
dividends, signalling financial health and a long-term commitment since capital markets 
punish dividends cuts (Jensen, 1986; Kothari et al., 2009).  
 DeAngelo et al. (2002) study in the bankruptcy process of L.A. Gear shows the 
importance of liquid assets (capability of turning assets into money) in managerial 
decisions. High liquid assets provided the firm with the internal funds to compensate six 
years of ongoing losses, meet debt payments and buying time and giving incentives for 
managers to finance losing operations, without the need for external funding. Therefore, 
highly liquid firms give incentives to managers to postpone imperative changes when the 
company is underperforming. Weiss and Wruck (1998) study the bankruptcy process of 
Eastern Airlines which resulted in a loss of two billion dollars, representing a devaluation 
of 50% of its market value at the filing for Chapter 11. They state that managers of distressed 
firms with liquid assets such as cash or planes, occur in a serious temptation to prolong 
firm’s survival, even though it can result in value destruction, even more if difficult 
decisions such as downsizing or closing the business are required. 
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 2.1.3 Information Asymmetry 
Managers, stockholders and creditors may not always have the same information. 
Therefore, corporate disclosure plays a critical role in reducing information asymmetry, 
agency conflicts between managers and investors and contributes for the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) which states that stock prices incorporates all information, being 
impossible to outperform the market. Firms disclose information through regulatory laws 
(financial reports and other regulatory fillings) and by voluntary communications 
(management forecasts, analysts’ reports, conference calls and press releases). Eng and Mak 
(2003) show that larger firms have greater voluntary disclosure and it increases in firms 
where managers have low ownership. On the other hand, low leveraged firms disclose less 
information (Eng and Mak., 2003; Ali et al., 2014), as debt is seen as a controlling 
mechanism of the free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986). More recently, Bertomeu and 
Magee (2015) find that firms that issue securities to the general public, which are obliged 
to mandatory disclosure, disclose meaningless information and it encourages managers’ 
interests not to disclosure bad information as a means to maximize current market prices. 
Financial analysts are valuable intermediaries in the capital markets by providing 
forecast about future prospects, recommendations to investors to buy, sell or hold the stock 
(Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Healy, Palepu, 2001). Lang and Lundholm (1996) results show 
that companies with forthcoming disclosures have greater analysts following which leads 
to having a large pooled funds that might be linked to a reduction in the cost of capital. 
Amiram et al. (2016) show that earnings announcements and management forecasts 
increase information asymmetry, at the announcement, between unsophisticated and 
sophisticated investors, as it includes information that is new for both type of investors. On 
the other hand, they conclude that analyst forecasts reduces information asymmetry at 
announcement as it contains valuable information only to unsophisticated investors. 
However, this gap between unsophisticated and sophisticated investors endures for a short 
period of time, fading away ten days after the announcement.  
In their review, Healy and Palepu (2001) state that financial reporting and disclosure 
contribute for the mitigation of agency costs. However, there are certain downfalls on 
disclosing information. Research in disclosing information shows that firms have incentives 
not to disclose information as their competitors also receive the information, reducing their 
competitive position therefore making financing costlier (Healy and Palepu ,2001). Kothari 
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et al. (2009) show that managers tend, on average, to delay the release of bad news to 
investors and leak good news early due to positive stock movements. This is consistent in 
their findings where the market reaction to good news is weaker than the reaction to bad 
news. Moreover, managers of distressed firms tend to delay the release of bad news because 
of career concerns. Hence, managers are successful in withholding bad news from investors, 
until it becomes inevitable from coming out (Kothari et al., 2009). Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy and others bankruptcies in the recent financial crisis are internally connected by 
the ability of managers in withholding bad news from the general public. 
 
2.2 Financial Fraud 
 
 2.2.1 Overview 
The general understanding about crime is “misleading and incorrect” (Sutherland, 
1940). His view is that the most serious crimes are not committed by the poor or delinquent 
but by the respected and well-known business leaders. In his speech on December 27, 1939 
in the fifty-second annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, he unveiled a new 
class of crime: “white collar crime”. Sutherland (1940) defines that white collar crime is 
expressed most frequently in the form of  “Misrepresentation in financial statements of 
corporations manipulation in the stock exchange, commercial bribery, bribery of public 
officials directly or indirectly in order to secure favourable contracts and legislation, 
misrepresentation in advertising and salesmanship, embezzlement and misapplication of 
funds, short weights and measures and misgrading of commodities, tax frauds, 
misapplication of funds in receiverships and bankruptcies.” Yu (2013) defines fraud as 
“firm’s or its manager’s misconduct behaviour, which causes material value loss to 
shareholders or stakeholders (e.g., creditors, customers, and suppliers) and which may 
trigger regulatory and/or legal enforcements”. 
The Great Depression (1929-1933), Dot.com bubble in 2001 and the most recent 
Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 have grabbed researchers’ attention to study the causes and 
aftermaths of financial crises. The period before the three financial crisis are somehow 
identical: plentiful liquidity in capital markets, an increase in financial innovation and a 
rising complexity of the financial products which weakened regulation and encouraged 
firms to increase their leverage (Carmassi, Gros and Micossi, 2009; Pauly, 2009; Eingner 
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and Umlauft 2015). Eingner and Umlauft, 2015 show that the prices in the housing market 
increased exponentially, creating a market-bubble, before the crisis of 1929 and 2007. They 
also suggest that when the housing prices starts to decline, it can be seen as a pre-event of 
a financial crisis. While the period before the financial crisis is a period of growth is also a 
period of fraud (Eingner and Umlauft, 2015). Charles Ponzi in 1920’s was able to embezzle 
his investors in nearly 20 million dollars through his complexed businesses schemes. Enron 
in 2001 filed for bankruptcy under the Chapter 11, losing its total value, from $90 a share 
in mid-2000 to under a $1 in 2001, due to unreported losses (Benston and Hartgraves, 2002).  
Why would managers engage in fraudulent activities if it turns out to be damaging for 
the firm? Albrecht et al. (2006) show three elements that are present in any kind of 
fraudulent act: (1) perceived pressure, (2) perceived opportunity and (3) some way to 
rationalize fraud as acceptable. Perceived pressure is mostly related to the financial need to 
report better results than the real ones. Perceived opportunity is when managers find an 
opportunity to engage in fraudulent activities with low probability of getting caught (weak 
board of directors or poor internal control mechanisms). Finally, management can come up 
with some rationalization on why to enter into fraudulent activities: “we needed to keep the 
price of stocks high”;” all companies use aggressive accounting practises”; “is for the good 
of the firm”). 
Every two years, the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE) publishes a 
report on Occupational Fraud and Abuse. In 2016, it analysed 2127 cases which resulted in 
a total loss of 6.3 billion dollars, with an average loss of 2.7 million dollars per case. Asset 
misappropriation is the most common form of occupational fraud (83% of the cases), 
however with the smallest median loss of $125,000. On the other hand, financial statement 
fraud is the least form of occupational fraud (< 10% of the case) but with a median loss of 
$975,000.  
 
 2.2.2 Corporate Governance 
Managers will not always act in the best interests of the shareholders (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Managers tend to be overconfident in their investments (Malmendier and 
Tate 2005), make the company larger but not more profitable (Jensen, 1986) and disclose 
good news earlier and hold bad news (Kothari et al., 2009). In order to motivate managers 
to act in shareholders’ interests, improving corporate governance and resolve agency 
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problems, the board can give incentives in the form of bonuses, performance rewards and 
shares of the company. If all of these mechanisms were created to control the management, 
how can it enrol in fraudulent activities? 
Fraud and non-fraud firms possess different patterns. Several studies find that the fraud 
firms have very deficient governance mechanisms (Beasley, 1996; Beasley et al., 1999; 
Aharony et al., 2015; C. Liu et al., 2016). The Board of directors in fraud firms is equally 
represented by outside and inside directors as in non-fraud firms it is dominated by outside 
directors, adding one outside member to the board reduces the likelihood of fraud and small 
boards are more efficient in monitoring management decisions than large boards (Beasley, 
1996), being consistent with Jensen (1993). Beasley et al. (1999) study fraud firms in three 
industries (technology, healthcare and financial services), finding that fraud firms have less 
independent audit committee and meetings with the auditing team, leading to an ineffective 
and misinformed board.  
There is a negative correlation between fraudulent activities and institutional ownership 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Aharony et al. (2015) finds that corporate lawsuits result in an 
increase of CEO turnover, decrease in CEO wages and trigger early departure of inside and 
outside directors, confirming Gilson (1990) hypothesis that outside directors’ main 
motivation to serve in the board derives from the reputation they build as expert monitors 
and that lawsuit can damage their reputation. Moreover, Brochet and Srinivasan (2014) 
argues that only 11% of independent directors are account as defendants in the lawsuits of 
the companies they used to serve. Finally, C. Liu et al. (2016) find that after the lawsuits 
CEOs struggle to find job and if they stay in the sued company, they assist to an increase in 
the number of outside directors. These findings are consistent with the idea that managers 
will hold bad news (in this case, fraudulent activities) due to their self-interests, mostly 
career prospects (Kothari et al., 2009).  
 
 2.2.3 Regulation & Causes 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was formed in 1934 as a result of the 
financial crisis of 1929 to regulate stocks, bonds and other securities with the hope to
_____________________  
2See: https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html      11 
 
 restore investor confidence in the capital markets. It has the purpose to provide accurate 
and meaningful information to investors, through the Act’s disclose requirements 
(operating history, profits in recent periods, financial position and so forth) in order to 
influence investment decisions, as stated: "to provide full and fair disclosure of the character 
of securities sold in interstate commerce and foreign commerce and through the mails, and 
to prevent fraud in the sale thereof, and for other purposes.”2 It also regulates the security 
transactions on the secondary market. SEC’s main goal is to ensure financial transparency 
and accuracy, reducing fraud and manipulation and therefore contribute for the efficient 
market hypothesis.  
In the aftermath of the Dot.com bubble with the crashes and frauds of Enron, WorldCom 
and other companies, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 was created with the goal to 
restore investor’s confidence in the securities markets. Ribstein (2002) states that this is the 
most important Act since the acts that formed the SEC, concerning fraud and corporate 
governance mechanisms. However, creating laws that rely in increasing penalties and 
monitoring power by independent directors and auditors, who have low-level of access to 
private information, has been seen as an inefficient way to deal with corporate fraud through 
the seventy years of SEC’s existence. Cohen et al. (2008) finds that accrual- based earnings 
management decreased and real earnings management increased after the SOX passage, 
implying not a decrease in fraud but a shift on the methods used by firms that are harder to 
detect confirming that “white collar crime” can be committed through several different 
ways (Sutherland, 1940). 
Managers often feel pressured to meet analysts’ earnings forecasts and investor’s 
recommendations, because they are concerned about their performance and they are hold 
accountable for stock performance (Fama, 1980; Warner et al., 1988). Ribstein (2002) in its 
review of regulation defends that large public companies’ managers need more monitoring 
in areas such as “insider transactions, compensation and selection and supervision of 
auditors.” He, X. Tian (2013) conclude that analysts exert pressure on managers to meet 
short-term goals (e.g. earning targets) sacrificing long-term firm value by not investing in 
innovative, riskier projects (destruction of firm innovation). McVay et al. (2006) evidence 
that managerial incentives are a key driver for managers to intentionally meet analyst 
earnings forecast in order to maintain stock prices steady and sell their shares. Skinner and 
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Sloan (2002) finds that missing analysts’ forecasts, even by little, leads to significant drops 
in stock price, especially in companies with growth opportunities. 
Adjusting firm’s financial reports to mislead shareholders about the real performance to 
influence contractual outcomes that otherwise were impossible and get low cost financing, 
is called earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996; Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Managers 
can use real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings in order to manipulate 
earnings. Accrual-based earnings management is achieved by changing accounting 
methods, like depreciation methods and shift gains or losses to provisions and accruals 
accounts. DuCharme et al. (2004) evidence positive increases in abnormal working capital 
accruals, on average, around stock offers, declining thereafter. Zang (2012) opines that there 
is a trade-off between the use of real activities manipulation and accrual-based earnings, 
based on their relative cost. Less competitive and unhealthy firms will engage more in 
accrual-based earnings management as they experience a higher level of scrutiny. Real 
activities manipulation is done in three different ways to alter reported earnings therefore 
avoiding losses: (1) Sales manipulations, by accelerating the timing of sales through 
aggressive discounts (2) Reduction of variable costs (R&D, advertising and maintenance) 
and (3) Overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold (COGS) (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
He shows that when debt, inventories, receivables and growth opportunities are present, the 
likelihood for manipulation activities increases.  
 
 2.2.4 Consequences 
The consequences of illegal and fraudulent practises when are made public can be 
catastrophic. Skinner (1994) argues that managers who fail to meet earnings forecasts, will 
increase the likelihood of being sued by stockholders, as stock prices’ dives, and face costly 
reputational losses. Skinner (1997) shows some evidence that early disclose of bad news 
can reduce litigation costs (smaller litigation settlements). Field et.al (2005) imply that large 
firms have higher securities litigation risk, confirming the “deep pockets” idea that fraud’s 
benefits outrank its costs. Karpoff, Lee and Martin (2008) estimates that firms lose, on 
average, 38% of their market value when misconduct news are reported. 
Stockholders’ lawsuits are typically brought under SEC’s regulation, which states that 
providing misleading information (e.g. earnings management) is an illicit act. SEC 
penalizes fraud firms through its accounting-based enforcement actions in the Accounting 
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and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs).  Dechow et al. (1996) finds that fraud 
companies experience, on the day of earnings announcement: on average, a decline of 9% 
in their stock prices, increase in risk (bid-ask spreads) which results in investors demanding 
higher returns and higher cost of debt, and significant loss of analysts following. Farber 
(2005) states that fraud firms experience negative abnormal returns and negative raw returns 
in three years following fraud detection, compared to non-fraud companies. In short-
window studies, Feroz, Park and Pastena (1991) analyse 224 AAER, finding an average 
loss of 7.5%, one-day prior to SEC’s disclosure. Palmore et al. (2004) find that firms obliged 
to restate their reports, suffer an average decrease of 9.2%, over a 2-day window. Karpoff, 
Lee and Martin (2008) examine 231 firms which were subject to class-action lawsuits, who 
conclude that that legal penalties and its consequences (investor’s adjustment to faulty 
information) explain 1/3 of firms’ market loss. Therefore, a significant loss (2/3) is due to 
reputational losses. 
Reputational Losses arise when “customers, suppliers, providers of financial capital, 
and other related parties revise their terms of trade once a firm’s willingness to act 
opportunistically is revealed” which leads to loss of sales, lower negotiation power with 
suppliers, loss of business opportunities, and an increase in risk and return rates demanded 
by investors (Murphy et al., 2009). Karpoff and Lott (1993) states that legal penalties only 
represent 6.5% of firm’s loss, indicating that 93.5% is due to reputational costs. Karpoff, 
Lee and Martin (2008) study 585 SEC’s enforcement (1978-2002), reporting on average, 
abnormal returns of -8.85% for filling announcements and -4.04% for settlement 
announcements. They conclude that reputation costs represent a significant fraction (2/3) of 
the firm’s total losses.  
Litigation and reputational costs and their aftermath can be destructive for firms and 
managers. Leuz et al. (2006) finds evidence between litigation risk and “going dark” or 
going private. Firms with weak financial health, low probability to survive in the future and 
in financial distress go dark, getting delisted or trade in the Over-The-Counter market 
(OTC), expecting less disclosure requirements and lower cost of capital. Going private leads 
to a restructure in ownership, more concentrated in managers and private investors (e.g. 
Private Equities) and usually leads to an increase of the level of debt (e.g. LBO). 
Furthermore, Leuz et al. (2006) finds that companies with weak governance, high levels of 
excess cash are more likely to go dark. Finally, Fich and Shivdasani (2009) conclude that 
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strong corporate governance will more likely fire sued directors which markets view as 
good news (positive returns when sued directors leave the firm) and the probability of 
director resigning is positively depending on SEC’s settlement amounts. 
3. Methodology 
 
 3.1 Fraud Sample 
The observations are drawn from the Securities Enforcement Empirical Database 
(SEED). SEED is a data base created by the cooperation between NYU Pollack Center for 
Law & Business and Cornerstone Research, that tracks SEC’s enforcement actions against 
public traded companies and its subsidiaries in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Releases (AAERs), beginning of the fiscal year of 2010.  
The procedures used to obtain the fraud firms sample are summarized in Panel A of 
Table 1. I retrieved a total of 608 AAERs. I began to eliminate 396 AAERs that were not 
enforced in the period of 2010-2013 with the purpose to study the causes and changes in 
the fraud companies in terms of corporate governance variables, risk and performance, 3 
years prior and 3 years after SEC’s enforcement (Dechow et al., 1996). I eliminate 86 
AAERs taken against subsidiaries and 58 AAERs against companies which were delisted, 
not trading in NASDAQ or NYSE and taken private (Merged, Acquired or Liquidated) until 
31-12-2016. I exclude companies in which the legal enforcement amount is zero (15), 
companies which are enforced more than one time, choosing the most recent (3) and firms 
that do not have complete fiscal information in The Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) between three years prior and three years after the enforcement date (5). This results 
in a final sample of 45 companies. 
Panel B of Table 1 shows that fraud firms are widely dispersed among industries, 
without any clusters of firms in any industry in specific. Panel C of Table 1 indicates that 
69 percent of the frauds involve Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (i.e., includes mainly 
fraudulent acts related to accounting manipulation strategies with the goal to increase sales, 
to hide actual losses and provide better financial and economical ratios). Panel D 
demonstrates that the number of cases analysed per year are nearly identical and that SEC’s 
enforcement median was the highest in the first year of analysis (twelve million dollars), 
decreasing to five and a half million dollars in the last year of analysis (2013). 
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TABLE 1 
Fraud Sample Selection, Fraud Firm Characteristics, and Control Group 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection of 45 firms subject to enforcement actions by 
the SEC between 2010 and 2013 
   
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases in the Securities Enforcement 
Empirical Database (SEED) 
 
 
608 
less AAERs outside the scope of analysis period (before 2010 and after 2013) 
 
396 
 
less AAERs against subsidiaries firms not listed in NASDAQ or NYSE and 
firms that got delisted, bankrupt or taken private in the period (2007-2016) 
 
144  
less AAERs which enforcements amount is zero, duplicated 
 
18 
 
less firms lacking fiscal information in CRSP for the period (2007-2016) 
 
5 
 
Final Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
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Panel B: Distribution of Fraud Firms by SIC Code 
Two-Digit SIC 
Code 
Industry Description Nº of 
Firms 
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 5 
20 Food and kindred Products 3 
23 Apparel 1 
28 Chemicals 4 
29 Petroleum Refining 2 
33 Primary Metal Industries 1 
34 Fabricating Metals 2 
35 Machinery and Computer Equipment 1 
36 Electrical 2 
37 Transportation Equipment 2 
38 Measurement Instruments 5 
44 Water Transportation 1 
49 Electric, Gas, Sanitary Services 1 
51 Wholesale Goods 1 
59 Miscellaneous Retail 1 
60 Depository Institutions 2 
61 Nondepository Credit Institution 2 
63 Insurance 1 
64 Insurance Agents, Brokers and Services 1 
73 Business Services 3 
80 Health Services 1 
87 Engineering, Accounting, Research, Management Services 1 
99 Miscellaneous 2 
 
Panel C: Fraud-Specific Statistics 
Allegation Type Number of firms Percentage Total 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 31 69 
Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 14 31 
 
Panel D: Fraud Size     
 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Number of cases                          13 12 8 12 
Median fraud amount (in millions $)     12 3.88 5.50 5.51 
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 3.2 Control Sample 
To study the effects of SEC’s enforcements in fraudulent firms, it is also imperative to 
study how non-fraud firms (firms not enforced by SEC between 2007-2016) react to SEC’s 
investigation disclosure. Therefore, we choose companies that have similar size (measured 
by Total Assets), Sales (Net Sales), Market Value and that are within the same industry (2-
SIC code) and stock exchange (NYSE and NASDAQ). Table 2 demonstrates that there are 
no significant differences in the means and medians of our fraud and control group. The 
variables were taken from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
 
TABLE 2 
Matching Statistics for Fraud and Control Group 
Variable 
Fraud Firm 
mean  
(in millions) 
Control Firm 
mean  
(in million) t stat 
Fraud Firm 
median  
(in millions) 
Control Firm 
median  
(in million) p-value 
Total Assets 144,451 117,840 0.99 14,994 15,340 0.16 
Net Sales 31,207 27,372 1.15 8,566 11,101 0.29 
Market Value 40,244 45,918 -1.02 8,516 12,056  
_____________________ 
Fraud firms are matched with control firm on the basis of year, net sales, size (Total Assets), Market Value, 
and SIC code. The t-statistic is for the difference between means of the matched pairs. The p-value is for 
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test. 
 
 
3.3 Variables 
 
 3.3.1 Abnormal Returns 
In order to study the impacts of certain episode in financial markets, one should conduct 
an event study to analytically understand its effects and realize if it derives from the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH). Considering a Semi-Strong Market Efficiency hypothesis – 
stock prices incorporate all market and public information available – there should be no 
presence of abnormal returns (AR) which is a EMH anomaly. 
Taking this into account, if one is able to prove the presence of unpredictable returns in 
a given stock or index by a significant event or changes in regulatory activity, such as SEC’s 
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enforcements, then one could determine the power of the event, only if the ARs are 
statistically significant. Ultimately, an event study aims to study the impacts of a certain 
event on firm’s market value. Initially, one should start by describing the event in question, 
the time-period subject to analysis (number of days surrounding the event day – event 
window) and the estimation period, used to estimate the parameters. 
 The events under analysis respects to SEC’s enforcements dates against US public 
traded companies between 2010 and 2013. The event windows used to retrieve the abnormal 
returns are 21 days around the event dates [-10,10] (period from T1 to T2), 7 days [-3,3] 
(period from T2 to T3) and 1 day prior to the event [-1,0] (period from T3 to T4), following 
Murphy et al. (2009) methodology. The estimation window respects to 250 daily returns 
before the beginning of the event window (period from T0 to T1), thus we have an acceptable 
basis to calculate the relevant parameters in order to guarantee that “estimators for the 
parameters of the normal return model are not influenced by the returns around the event” 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  
The formula for the Abnormal Returns is the following: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡)                                              (1) 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑡) are the abnormal, actual and normal returns over period 
t. 𝑋𝑡 is the known information to calculate the normal return model. The actual return relates 
to the rate return on stock i over day t whereas the expected normal return is statistically 
calculated with the available data. In order to calculate the normal returns, we need to 
choose a statistical model in which returns follows a set of statistical assumptions. We are 
going to use the market model since it assumes a linear relation between market’s return 
and firm’s returns as well as resolving the sensitivity of results based on CAPM restrictions.  
Thus, to measure the Normal Returns Model the following formula was applied for the 
estimation window: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                          (2) 
Since the abnormal returns computations are not included in the estimation window, the 
parameters ?̂? and ?̂? are not residuals in the OLS. Therefore, abnormal returns can be 
calculated as followed: 
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𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂? − ?̂?𝑅𝑚𝑡                                       (3) 
To get a broader understanding of the results, we use an index portfolio method, value-
weighted returns (market returns as S&P 500 composite index) in computing the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR): 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1                                                (4) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[𝑇1, 𝑇2] = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡
𝑇2
𝑇1
                                             (5) 
The statistical significance of all the variables are calculated using a cross-sectional 
standard error, t-statistics for the mean abnormal returns. 
 
 3.3.2 Changes in Risk 
SEC’s investigation disclosure and the following enforcements on firms due to alleged 
illegal activities can, not only affect share returns but also the cost of acquiring new funds 
– cost of capital. Bid-ask spreads movements can be used as a proxy to investigate whether 
investors of enforced firms demand higher returns ex post (Dechow et al., 1996) as firm’s 
risk increases due to eventual litigation risk which can result in significant distress costs, 
mainly related to reputation losses and business deterioration (loss of key employees, clients 
and good investing opportunities). 
Following Dechow et al. (1996) approach we obtain the daily bid-ask spread data for 
the 90 firms (45 fraudulent and 45 in the control group) from CRSP. We also retrieve 
directly from CRSP both daily price and volume as they are important variables in 
explaining bid-ask spreads’ behaviour. Although the number of market makers is an 
important variable, it was not possible to collect the data. Our event period respects to forty 
days before SEC’s enforcement announcement and forty days after the announcement, [-
40,40]. Our estimation window respects to 200 trading days before the beginning of the 
event in order to calculate the parameters α and β for each company through the following 
formula: 
𝐵𝑖𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖                                    (6) 
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Where for firm i: 
 Volumei = log of  
bid−ask
(bid+ask)/2
    
 Pricei  = log of bid price 
From each regression we get the predicted values of α0, β1 and β2 which are going to be 
used in the following equation to calculate the predicted bid-ask spreads for each firm i on 
day t relative to SEC’s enforcement day: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝐵𝑖𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑘 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 +  ?̂?1𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ?̂?2𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡                (7) 
The difference between the actual bid-ask spread for firm i on day t and the predicted 
bid-ask spread for firm i on day t is calculated to determine the residual bid-ask spreads. 
  
 3.3.3 Governance Changes 
Event studies are used to study market episodes such as changes in regulation. Studying 
the magnitude of stock returns and changes in risk (bid-ask spreads) related to SEC’s 
enforcements against fraudulent firms is important, however short-windowed. Thus, it is 
imperative to study the characteristics of the enforced and control group firms with the goal 
to understand and spot the main differences in key corporate governance mechanisms in 
these two groups of firms which could valuably contribute in discovering certain patterns 
of illegal conduct within businesses and improve SEC’s timing in detecting white-collar 
crime activity.  
In prior research (Beasley et al., 1999 and Farber, 2005) fraud firms show, in general, a 
weaker corporate governance structure than non-fraud firms, in several key areas before 
SEC’s announcement. However, research also shows that fraud firms tend to improve their 
governance ex post, becoming more similar to the control firms (non-fraud). To analyse the 
changes in corporate governance, we retrieve for each firm its Environmental, Social and 
Governance report (ESG) from Thompson Reuters Eikon.  
We were able to retrieve governance information between one-year prior (Initial) to the 
event and four years after the Initial (Final) for 32 fraud firms matching the number of firms 
for our control group. This gives us a sample of 64 companies between the years 2009-
2016. Following Farber (2005) methodology we collect the following governance variables 
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from Thompson Reuters Eikon: Size of the board of directors (#BoardSize), number of 
board meetings per year (#BoardMet), proportion of outside directors in the board 
(OutsideDir%), number of outside directors (#OutsideDir) calculated as OutsideDir% times 
#BoardSize, percentage of firms where the CEO also occupies the position as chairman of 
the board (CEO=CHAIRMAN%) and the total compensation per director (Compensation). 
CEO=CHAIRMAN% is a dummy variable where if the CEO is also chairman of the board 
turns the value of 1 otherwise 0. From Thomson Reuters Institutional (13f) Holdings we 
collect the following variables:  percentage of outstanding shares held by blockholders 
(Block%) and the percentage of institutional ownership (InstOwn%). 
 
4. Results & Discussion 
All things considered, one would expect that regulatory sanctions by SEC would 
evidently affect negatively stocks’ returns, positively firms’ risk and empower mainly, fraud 
firms to implement essential changes in their corporate governance mechanisms. Therefore, 
we predict that fraud firms experience negative CARs around the event, become riskier for 
investors (positive changes in residuals bid-ask spreads) and has poorer governance 
mechanism than non-fraud firms. On the other side, one would expect that the control group, 
which operates in the same industry, would beneficiate from this event, seeing its share 
price soar (positive CARs), as its competitors incur in several costs (e.g. amount of the legal 
penalty and reputational losses). Moreover, one could expect smaller changes in the control 
group risk as it experiences some spillover effect from the event. Finally, one could expect 
that non-fraud firms have stronger corporate governance than fraud firms in order to prevent 
illegal practises by their management.  
 
 4.1 Event Study Results 
The study concentrates on the 21-day event window [-10,10] to better capture the 
magnitude of share price movement in a wider time period before and after fraud 
announcement than a 3-day window. Cumulative abnormal returns are shown, followed by 
a summarizing section for the other event windows (3-day window and 1-day window), 
both for fraud firms and control group computed using value-weighted index. 
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Figure 1 presents a plot of the cumulative abnormal returns. The plot indicates that 
before the event [-10, -1] fraud firms experience, on average, CAR of -0.39%, recording a 
maximum loss on day -4 (-0.69%). On the day of the event, fraud firms record, on average, 
a negative CAR of -0.18%. These results imply that there is a leakage of information prior 
to the official fraud announcement. Nevertheless, from [+1, +10] fraud firms experience, 
on average, a positive CAR of 0.36%, with the maximum on day +7 (0.78%). These results 
suggest that after SEC’s enforcement and knowing the value of the settlement amount, 
investors start believing again in the company. Moreover, since our sample is based on 
AAERs for big public traded companies for a period after the financial crisis of 2007-08, 
we can conclude that regulators act late and ineffectively in the use of their powers and that 
legal penalties does not affect significantly firm’s returns. Furthermore, at this time, big 
companies already did the necessary adjustments in their businesses to prevent being caught 
and have switch to more advanced and innovative ways of committing financial fraud. 
Overall, fraud firms in the 21-day window, the only day with significant losses, is at the 
first day of the event window (-10) with an average loss of -0.36% at a level of significance 
of 5% (t = -2.14). 
For the control group, we discover a medium negative correlation of -0.47 between the 
two groups for the 21-day event window. Moreover, the control group evidences, on 
average, positive CAR of 0.17% before the event [-10, -1], recording a maximum gain on 
day -3 (0.62%). This evidences that investors in non-fraud firms benefit, in the short-run, 
with their competitors being sued. On the day of the event, control firms record, on average, 
a positive CAR of 0.30%. However, after the event day [+1, +10] control firms record, on 
average, negative CAR of -0.08%, recording a minimum of -0.41% in the last day of the 
event window. These results imply that big corporations being legally enforced, not only 
affects them but also other players in the same industry – spillover effect.  Overall, control 
firms in the 21-day window, the only day with significant losses, is at the first day of the 
event window (-10) with an average loss of -0.34% at a level of significance of 10% (t = -
1.93). 
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FIGURE 1 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
Cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of fraud and control group over 21-day event 
window 
 
 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the other two event windows: 7-day and 2-
day window. For both event windows, we conclude that CARs are not statistically 
significant and that mean CARs signals changes for both groups. As the event window 
becomes narrower around the event day, fraud firms experience positive CARs as control 
firms experience, on average negative CARs. However, fraud firms tend to have wider 
range of CARs for all event windows. These results are consistent with previous research 
that legal enforcements are not significant for firm’s loss.   
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics: Fraud and Control firms CARs 
Panel A: Fraud Companies 
 Mean Min Max t-stat 
CAR (-1;0) 0.15% -5.57% 6.71% 0.52 
CAR (-3;+3) 0.49% -13.34% 11.43% -1.00 
CAR (-10;+10) -0.02% -19.48% 19.74% -0.31 
Panel B: Control Companies 
CAR (-1;0) -0.13% -5.90% 4.57% -0.67 
CAR (-3;+3) -0.01% -8.74% 10.94% 0.1 
CAR (-10;+10) 0.06% -17.36% 17.83% 0.02 
 
 
 4.2 Residual bid-ask spread – Changes in Firm’s Risk 
The study concentrates in the changes in the means of the residuals bid-ask spreads forty 
days before SEC’s announcement [-40, -1] and forty days after [+1, +40]. Figure 2 and 
Figure 3 presents two plots of the changes in the residuals bid-ask spread for fraud and 
control firms, respectively and the average for the both. Furthermore, Table 4 presents the 
summary statistics for the mean changes of the residuals bid-ask spread. 
 Figure 2 presents a plot of the residual bid-ask spreads for the fraud sample. The plot 
indicates that prior to SEC’s enforcement date and thereafter [-40, +40], the average residual 
bid-ask spread is negative (-0.03). Cross-sectional analysis, indicates that we have thirty-
four days where fraud firms experience statistically significant changes in risk. Three days 
at a level of significance of 10%, sixteen days at a level of significance of 5% and fifteen 
days at a level of significance of 1%. Prior to announcement [-40, -1], the average residual 
bid-ask spread is negative (-0.04). However, after the announcement [+1, +40] the average 
residual bid-ask spread is negative but bigger (-0.027). Moreover, this changes in the means 
residual bid-ask spread are statistically significant at a level of 1% (t = 3.23). These results 
are consistent with previous research, implying that investors after regulatory enforcements, 
see fraud firms as riskier, demanding higher returns on their investment therefore exercising 
more pressure on management to provide better results in the future.   
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FIGURE 2 
Residual bid-ask spreads – Fraud firms 
Residual bid-ask spreads for fraud firms around the SEC’s enforcement. The straight 
lines are the mean residual bid-ask spread prior and after the enforcement (excluding day 
0). 
 
Figure 3 presents a plot of the residual bid-ask spreads for the control sample. The plot 
indicates that prior to SEC’s enforcement date and thereafter [-40, +40], the average residual 
bid-ask spread is negative (-0.11). Cross-sectional analysis, indicates that we only have one 
day (-31) where control firms experience statistically significant changes in risk at a level 
of significance of 10%. Prior to announcement [-40, -1], the average residual bid-ask spread 
is negative (-0.12). However, after the announcement [+1, +40] the average residual bid-
ask spread is negative but bigger (-0.11). Moreover, this changes in the means residual bid-
ask spread are not statistically significant (t = 1.37). These results are consistent with 
previous research, implying that non-fraud firms are seen as less risky by investors. On the 
other hand, control firms became non-significantly riskier as they are affected by the 
significant positive changes in risk of the fraud companies, proving that there is some 
spillover effect between firms that operate in the same industry. 
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FIGURE 3 
Residual bid-ask spreads – Control firms 
Residual bid-ask spreads for control firms around the SEC’s enforcement. The straight 
lines are the mean residual bid-ask spread prior and after the enforcement (excluding day 
0). 
 
 
 Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the changes in mean residual bid-ask spreads 
for fraud and control firms. Furthermore, Table 4 presents the R-squared value of the predicted 
bid-ask spreads model in which, our values are lower than previous research. 
  
 TABLE 4 
Summary Statistics: Residual bid-ask spreads for fraud and control firms  
 
Panel A: Fraud Companies 
  Mean Min Max 
[- 1, - 40] -0.04 -0.07 0.00 
[+1, +40] -0,03 -0.08 0.04 
(t-stat)        (3.23)***   
R-squared 0.31     
Panel B: Control Companies 
[- 1,- 40] -0.12 -0.17 -0.05 
[+1,+40] -0.11 -0.18 -0.04 
(t-stat) (1.37)   
R-squared 0.18     
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, based on differences in means 
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 4.3 Governance Changes 
The study concentrates on analysing the mean changes in key corporate governance 
variables, one year prior to SEC’s enforcement (Initial Year) and the following four years 
being the four year the last year of the period analysis (Final Year) with the goal to 
understand either or not governance is important in controlling corporate criminal acts. 
Table 5 provides tests of significance in governance changes variables for 32 matching pairs 
of fraud and control firms. The mean changes for the governance variables are measured 
with the Initial Year as basis. 
Table 5, Panel A, provides evidence that the board of directors’ characteristics are, in 
general, identical for fraud and control firms. Fraud and control firms’ boards are highly 
controlled by outside directors, however control firms have higher percentage of outside 
directors (OutsideDir%) in their boards, have smaller board size (#BoardSize) and have less 
board meetings (#BoardMet) than fraud firms for all the period analysis. These results are 
consistent with previous research which states that firms’ management decisions with 
smaller boards are easier to be monitored. The mean changes in governance variables during 
the analysis are not statistically significant for any of the variables. However, at the last year 
of the analysis period, both fraud and control firms have increased the percentage of outside 
directors and fraud firms have increased the average number of board meetings, from 8.69 
to 9.4. Overall, we find that, contrary to previous research, independent directors were not 
better monitors than inside directors in the Financial Crisis of 2007-08 and afterwards. One 
possible explanation for the incapacity of outside directors to monitor criminal management 
decisions tends with the innovative and more complexed mechanisms of financial 
misconduct, unveiled during and after the recent Financial Crisis which were normally large 
and complexed schemes with a multitude of different players. 
Table 5, Panel B, provides evidence that in the year prior to SEC’s enforcement, on 
average, 56.23 percent of CEOs of fraud firms are also the board’s chairman 
(CEO=CHAIRMAN%). Interestingly we find that the percentage of CEOs of control firms 
who also are board’s chairman is higher (78.13) and the mean difference between fraud and 
control firms is statistically significant at a 10% level confidence (t = -1.89). During the 
analysis period, we see significant changes in CEO=CHAIRMAN%, except for year 1. In 
the final year, there is no significant differences between fraud and control firms regarding 
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CEO=CHAIRMAN%. This gives us enlightenment that it is not because managers also 
possess the position of chairman that they can manipulate or influence the board to act on 
behalf on their own interests, refuting previous research. 
 
TABLE 5 
Univariate Comparisons of Board of Director and Other Governance Variables 
Panel A: Board of Directors Characteristics 
  Year 
Variables Firm Initial 1 2 3 4 Final 
OutsideDir% Fraud 81.43 1.50 2.21 2.22 1.73 83.16 
 Control 83.15 -0.06 1.01 0.49 1.76 84.91 
 (t-stat) (-0.61) (1.16) (0.86) (0.99) (-0.02) (-0.64) 
#OutsideDir Fraud 9.38 -0.13 -0.16 -0.09 -0.09 9.28 
 Control 9.31 -0.03 0.03 0.25 0.13 9.44 
 (t-stat) (0.1) (-0.28) (-0.46) (-0.71) (-0.50) (-0.28) 
#BoardSize Fraud 11.53 -0.09 -0.31 -0.25 -0.19 11.34 
 Control 11.22 0.03 -0.03 0.25 0.00 11.22 
 (t-stat) (0.52) (-0.48) (-0.71) (-1.14) (-0,44) (0.23) 
#BoardMet Fraud 8.69 0.66 -0.09 0.15 1.05 9.4 
 Control 8.25 0.19 -0.50 0.06 -0.16 8.09 
 (t-stat) (0.55) (0.64) (0.51) (0.04) (1.00) (1.53) 
 
Panel B: Other Governance Variables 
 
CEO=CHAIRMAN% Fraud 56.25 -3.13 9.38 12.50 9.38 65.63 
 Control 78.13 -3.13 -6.25 -6.25 -9.38 68.75 
 (t-stat) (-1.89)* (0.00)  (1.91)* (2.17)** (2.17)** (-0.26) 
Block% Fraud 12.02 0.76 4.34 5.99 10.17 22.20 
 Control 13.24 3.17 5.08 7.86 9.14 22.38 
 (t-stat) (-0.39) (-1.04) (-0.22) (-0.61) (0.29) (-0.05) 
InstOwn% Fraud 0.61 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.56 
 Control 0.76 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.09 0.68 
 (t-stat) (-3.06)*** (0.27) (0.30) (0.36) (1.86)* (-2.48)** 
Compensation Fraud 2,600,041 -5,365 34,731 89,359 474,677 3,074,719 
 Control 2,308,468 384,415 542,605 734,982 726,780 3,035,248 
  (t-stat) (0.95) (-1.46) (-1.81)* (-2.45)** (-0.98) (0.12) 
*, **, *** Significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, based on differences in means for the 32 
matched pairs 
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Panel B of Table 5 also indicates that for control and fraud firms, the percentage of 
blockowners, who holds more than 5% of shares outstanding (Block%), is identical and 
increases for all the years in the analysis period. We also find that the percentage of 
institutional ownership (InstOwn%) is significant lower, at a confidence level of 1%, in 
fraud firms one year prior to the regulatory enforcement (t = -3.06). The mean changes in 
InstOwn% are negative for all the period analysis, however only significant at a confidence 
level of 10% in the year 4 (t = 1.86). However, the mean changes in InstOwn% between 
fraud and control firms have decreased, still being significant at a confidence level of 5% (t 
= -2.48) at the Final Year. Finally, we discover that one year prior to legal enforcement, the 
mean directors’ compensation (Compensation) is not statistically significant, being higher 
in fraud firms. However, in year 1 the mean changes in Compensation are negative for the 
fraud firms, confirming that criminal conduct affects directors’ compensation, however not 
significantly. Year 2 and 3 in our period analysis records a significant positive changes in 
directors’ compensation at a confidence level of 10% (t = -1.81) and 5% (t = -2.45), 
respectively. In the Final year of our analysis period, we conclude that there are no 
significant differences in Compensation between fraud and control firms, however there is 
some evidence that directors’ compensation is affected by corporate misconduct. 
In sum, we find that one year prior to SEC’s enforcement, fraud firms and control firms 
were somehow identical, however fraud firms present slightly poorer corporate governance. 
The mean percentage of outside directors in fraud firm’s board is lesser than in control 
firms, the mean board size is larger for fraud firms, mean institutional ownership is 
significantly lower in fraud firms and mean director’s compensation is negatively affected 
only in the year of SEC’s investigation disclosure and following enforcement, being quickly 
fixed for the following years. Furthermore, we find evidence that in the following years, 
fraud firms make necessary changes in their governance mechanisms in order to restore 
their reputation thereby restoring investors’ confidence therefore while becoming more 
similar to non-fraud firms which have stronger corporate governance.     
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5. Conclusion 
This study gives enlightenment on the relationship between corporate fraud and 
regulatory sanctions, and how it affects firm’s returns, firm’s risk in the short-run. 
Moreover, for the long-run, it studies the mean changes in governance variables applied by 
the enforced firms in order to prevent same actions in the future. It uses a sample of 45 firms 
enforced by the SEC from 2010 to 2013, to study the changes in stock returns and changes 
in risk. For the mean changes in governance variables, our sample is 32 matched-paired 
firms (fraud and control groups), and it studies from one year prior to SEC’s enforcement 
year and the four years after, which gives us a sample between 2009 to 2016. 
This study reveals that legal penalties do not affect significantly firm’s returns, which 
is consistent with Murphy et al. (2009) results. Some plausible reasons for it can be related 
with the sample retrieved where most of the firms are big size firms, consistent with Field 
et.al (2005) “deep pockets” idea that large firms have higher litigation risk because fraud’s 
benefits outrank its costs. Also the period in analysis, period after the recent financial crisis, 
companies may have already implemented imperative changes in their business, and market 
regulators’ inefficiency in finding out criminal financial activity.  This study also finds that 
firm’s risk (residual bid-ask spreads) significantly increases (t = 3.23) for fraud firms after 
regulatory enforcements as investors perceive enforced firms as riskier than non-fraud 
firms, demanding higher returns on its investments, which is consistent with previous 
research (Dechow et al., 1996; Murphy et al., 2009).  
Finally, this study shows that fraud and non-fraud firms are somehow identical in terms 
of their corporate governance mechanisms. Board of directors’ variables are very similar 
between fraud and non-fraud firms which is contrary to previous research, that outside 
directors are better monitors of management decisions. Plausible reasons for these results 
can be that the financial crisis of 2007-08 was characterized by very complexed schemes, 
with complexed financial instruments involved that nobody fully understood the real 
consequences of those decision. Furthermore, the integration of external important players, 
like rating agencies, banks and even the government could have helped in rationalizing 
fraudulent management decisions, “if everybody does it” (Albrecht et al. 2006). Moreover, 
the study shows that director’s compensation is affected by legal penalties and that fraud 
firms in the following years after SEC’s enforcement tend to improve their governance 
variables, by becoming more similar to their non-fraud firms. 
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This study contributes to the accounting literature. It adds knowledge of the link 
between financial fraud, litigation risk and their impact on firm’s financial distress costs. It 
also sheds light on the inefficiency of market regulators (SEC), during and after the recent 
financial crisis, in investigating and prosecuting financial misconduct, and that financial 
fraud did not decrease but have become more complexed and harder to be detected (Cohen 
et al., 2008).  
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7. Appendix  
 
TABLE 6 
Defendant Name Date Allegation Type Payment Volume ($) 
Archer-Daniels-Midland Company 20-Dec-2013 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 36 467 366 
Assurant, Inc. 21-Jan-2010 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 3 500 000 
Alliance One International, Inc. 06-Aug-2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 10 000 000 
Aon Corporation 20-Dec-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 14 545 020 
Ball Corporation 24-Mar-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 300 000 
BP p.l.c. 15-Nov-2012 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 525 000 000 
Citigroup Inc. 29-Jul-2010 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 75 000 001 
Capital One Financial Corporation 24-Apr-2013 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 3 500 000 
Diebold, Inc. 22-Oct-2013 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 22 972 942 
Deutsche Telekom, AG 29-Dec-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 4 000 000 
ENI, S.p.A. 07-Jul-2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 125 000 000 
NIC Inc. 12-Jan-2011 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 500 000 
Fifth Third Bancorp 04-Dec-2013 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 6 500 000 
Technip 28-Jun-2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 98 000 000 
General Electric Company 27-Jul-2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 23 478 614 
Healthsouth Corp. 26-Jul-2010 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 100 000 000 
Huron Consulting Group Inc. 19-Jul-2012 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 1 066 335 
International Business Machines  18-Mar-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 10 000 000 
Innospec, Inc. 18-Mar-2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 60 071 613 
Johnson & Johnson 08-Apr-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 48 666 316 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. 19-Sep-2013 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 200 000 000 
Eli Lilly and Company 20-Dec-2012 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 29 398 734 
Medifast, Inc. 18-Sep-2013 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 200 000 
Maxwell Technologies Inc. 31-Jan-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 6 350 890 
Noble Corporation 04-Nov-2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 5 576 998 
Office Depot, Inc. 21-Oct-2010 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 1 000 000 
Orthofix International N.V. 10-Jul-2012 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 5 225 701 
Oracle Corporation 16-Aug-2012 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2 000 000 
PACCAR Inc 03-Jun-2013 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 225 000 
Pfizer Inc. 07-Aug-2012 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 26 339 945 
Koninklijke Philips Electronics 05-Apr-2013 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 4 515 178 
Parker Drilling Company 16-Apr-2013 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 4 090 818 
Transocean Inc. 04-Nov-2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 7 265 080 
Ralph Lauren Corp. 22-Apr-2013 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 734 846 
Rockwell Automation, Inc. 03-May-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 2 761 091 
Raytheon Corporation 25-Jun-2010 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 12 000 000 
Smith & Nephew PLC 06-Feb-2012 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 5 426 799 
Stryker Corporation 24-Oct-2013 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 13 283 523 
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Tidewater Inc. 04-Nov-2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 11 321 362 
Thor Industries, Inc. 13-May-2011 Issuer Reporting and Disclosure 1 000 000 
Tenaris S.A. 17-May-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 5 428 338 
Tyson Foods, Inc. 10-Feb-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1 214 477 
Weatherford International plc 26-Nov-2013 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 65 612 360 
Watts Water Technologies, Inc. 13-Oct-2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 3 776 606 
Biomet Inc. 26-Mar-2012 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 5 575 731 
 
